The Question of Animal Selves: Implications for Sociological Knowledge and Practice by Irvine, Leslie
WellBeing International 
WBI Studies Repository 
4-2007 
The Question of Animal Selves: Implications for Sociological 
Knowledge and Practice 
Leslie Irvine 
University of Colorado at Boulder 
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/antant 
 Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Comparative Psychology Commons, and the Other 
Anthropology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Irvine, Leslie (2007) “The question of animal selves: Implications for sociological knowledge and 
practice.” Qualitative Sociology Review, Vol. III Issue 1. Retrieved Month, Year 
(http://www.qualitativesociologyreview.org /ENG/archive_eng.php) 
This material is brought to you for free and open access 
by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for 
inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI 




©2005-2007 Qualitative Sociology Review 
 Volume III Issue 1    www.qualitativesociologyreview.org 
5 
 
Qualitative Sociology Review 




University of Colorado at Boulder, USA 
 





The question of whether sociologists should investigate the subjective 
experience of non-human others arises regularly in discussions of research on 
animals. Recent criticism of this research agenda as speculative and therefore 
unproductive is examined and found wanting. Ample evidence indicates that 
animals have the capacity to see themselves as objects, which meets 
sociological criteria for selfhood. Resistance to this possibility highlights the 
discipline’s entrenched anthropocentrism rather than lack of evidence. 
Sociological study of the moral status of animals, based on the presence of the 
self, is warranted because our treatment of animals is connected with numerous 
“mainstream” sociological issues. As knowledge has brought other forms of 
oppression to light, it has also helped to challenge and transform oppressive 
conditions. Consequently, sociologists have an obligation to challenge 
speciesism as part of a larger system of oppression.  
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The intelligence of the lower forms of animal life, like a great deal of human 
intelligence, does not involve a self. (Mead [1934] 1962: 135) 
Future human-animal investigations should probably focus less on unverifiable 
speculations about the inner lives of animals and examine instead what is 
knowable about human-animal interactions and the significance that humans 
attribute to them. (Jerolmack 2005: 660) 
Because animals do not, and cannot (I argue), wonder what humans (or any 
other organism) are ‘thinking’ they do not (and cannot) possess a mind or self. 
(Waskul 2004) 
 
Do non-human animals have selves? Is the answer relevant for sociology, and if 
so, how? Most mainstream sociological work does not consider animals at all. For 
that matter, most mainstream sociology does not consider the issue of selves, 
regardless of species. For the majority of topics that sociologists study, the self never 
enters the picture. Consequently, one could easily dismiss the relevance of animals’ 
inner lives for the discipline. As conveyed in the quote from Colin Jerolmack (2005) 
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above, some see this as the more productive sociological position: Let us 
concentrate on verifiable observations and focus on what animals mean for human 
lives. Despite this advice, a number of the seminal sociological works on human-
animal interaction engage with questions about animal selves. Janet and Steven 
Alger (1997, 1999, 2003a) have observed interaction among cats and between cats 
and humans for over a decade. In their book, Cat Culture (2003a), they draw on 
extensive ethnography in a cat shelter and in multi-cat households to show how cats 
manifest self-awareness. Using indicators outlined by cognitive ethologist Donald 
Griffin (1976, 1992) and biologist Marian Stamp Dawkins (1987, 1998), among 
others, Alger and Alger document a wide range of emotions, the ability to learn from 
others, cooperation, adaptation, and complexity of behavior within the cat community. 
Clinton Sanders (1999, 2000, 2003) focuses on interactions between people and 
dogs. His qualitative research consistently presents a view of animals as minded, 
social actors who “have at least a rudimentary ability to construct meaning—to 
purposefully define situations and devise coherent plans of action on the basis of 
these definitions” (1999: 5). His studies of people and their canine companions have 
led him to advocate an expanded view of “personhood” and of the process through 
which we construct and assign that designation. He also argues for “an expanded 
view of mind that, like personhood, we can best understand as arising out of social 
interaction” (2003: 407). Moreover, his work demonstrates that “the conventional, 
linguicentric perspective on mind-as-internal-conversation is inadequate and 
confining” (2003: 407). Along similar lines, Keri Brandt’s (2004) ethnographic 
research on human-horse interaction suggests the need for a new understanding of 
language that emphasizes the embodied nature of subjectivity. Likewise, Krzysztof 
Konecki (2005) argues that corporeality is the basis for a shared reality between 
companion animals and their guardians. My work (Irvine 2004a, b, c), makes use of 
ethnography and interviews to develop a model of animal selfhood based on 
concepts used in studies of the subjective experience of infants. Instead of relying on 
a language-based model of the self, I offer a wider conceptual lens that emphasizes 
the components of interaction. I have also examined play between humans and 
animals as a window on intersubjective experience (Irvine, 2001). In studies of 
children’s interaction with animals, Olin Myers (1998) found that even without spoken 
language, an animal could be “a genuine (not merely projected or falsely assimilated) 
‘other’” to a child “in the dialectical and self-reflective process of subjective and 
objective senses of self” (Myers 2003: 56) 
 These works argue that animal selves are verifiable through observation; 
however, we must first rethink how and what we will observe. Exploring the question 
of animal selves constitutes nothing less than a reshaping of the discipline. As this 
essay points out, this reshaping is long overdue. Sociologists regularly overlook, 
disparage, and dismiss evidence of similarities between humans and other animals 
(see Arluke 2003; Kruse 2003). One can only dismiss the importance of animals’ 
inner lives by dismissing entire bodies of research that document human-animal 
continuity in the form of animal minds, communication skills, and emotions. In what 
follows, I examine why animal selves are important for sociology, arguing that the 
omission stems more from the discipline’s anthropocentric assumptions rather than 
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On (re)defining the self 
To explore the possibility of animal selves, it would be helpful to have a 
definition of what we should look for. However a singular definition of the self is 
problematic because the term refers to a range of behavioral, cognitive, and 
emotional manifestations. As a term, “the self” is folk psychology. It encompasses 
“what everybody knows” about why people act and think as they do. Consequently, 
the term has numerous uses. It can refer to the self-concept, or to self-esteem, the 
soul, the “inner child” of pop psychology, or a host of other ideas (see Irvine 1999 for 
a review). Some might even argue that selfhood is an illusion or a fiction. A “sense” 
of self might not be a sense at all, but simply an epiphenomenon, or side-effect of the 
way our brains function. 
Traditionally, the sociological starting point for defining the self is Mead’s 
assertion that it involves the capacity to see oneself as an object. This capacity gives 
humans the ability to coordinate activities with others in complex social 
environments. Mead ([1934] 1962) claimed that the self developed alongside the 
capacities for spoken language and the reflective capacities of the mind. He argued 
that the self is a product of evolution, allowing for complex, adaptive social behavior.i 
These abilities made human society possible by coordinating uniquely complex forms 
of interaction.  
 Mead pointed out that the process of seeing ourselves as objects involves the 
appearance of a “me” in consciousness (Mead 1913). Selfhood therefore 
presupposes consciousness. In this sense, consciousness means more than simply 
wakefulness or awareness of sensation (being “conscious” rather than 
“unconscious”). Consciousness, as used here, is more akin to self-consciousness, in 
that it involves the reflexive capacity. This, in turn, allows us to adapt our behavior, 
which is a valuable skill in a complex social world. 
 At this point, a basic working definition of the self becomes possible. It can be 
defined as an image (or images) of ourselves (as an object) that appears in 
consciousness, around which we adapt our subsequent behavior. For Mead, and for 
generations of sociologists to follow, the self distinguishes humans from other 
animals. Mead was very certain that the “lower animals,” as he referred to them, did 
not have the capacity to see themselves as objects. In the epigraph by Dennis 
Waskul at the start of this paper, taken from the discussion list of the Society for the 
Study of Symbolic Interaction, the belief that animals are unable to see themselves 
as objects still holds, at least for some scholars. Research has shown that Mead was 
mistaken.ii 
 
Do animals have selves? 
Animals and Consciousness 
There is ample evidence that many species of animals can see themselves as 
objects. Those who take a skeptical position on animal selves would up the ante by 
requiring that the definition of the self includes language. However, I would argue that 
most of the instances in which we humans see ourselves as objects do not involve 
language. If we simply look for evidence of the capacity to see oneself as an object, 
which indicates consciousness, then non-human animals can enter the conversation. 
Few would deny that non-human animals can adapt their behavior. Moreover, 
behavioral flexibility is among the features commonly drawn on to support attributions 
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of consciousness among animals (Griffin 1976, 1992; see also Allen and Bekoff 
1997, 153). Examples of animals adapting their behavior are abundant, among wild 
as well as domesticated animals. For instance, dog training involves encouraging the 
dog to shape his or her behavior to human expectations (see Arluke and Sanders 
1996; Sanders 1999; Irvine 2004a). Dogs will also modify their behavior on their own. 
For example, while walking with my dog, Skipper, I began throwing a stick into a 
creek for him to retrieve. We stood on a smoothly banked section of the creek, and 
Skipper waded into shoulder-deep water to get the stick. However, at one point, the 
current carried the stick to an area with deeper water and a steep, cliff-like bank. 
Skipper does not enjoy swimming. He could have given up on the stick as it 
disappeared downstream. Instead, after investigating the bank further down the 
creek, he found another smoothly inclined spot and waited for the stick to arrive.iii 
There could be many explanations for Skipper’s behavior, but one of these surely 
must be a rudimentary understanding of causality and the ability to adjust one’s 
behavior to intervene in the action.  
 Although cats are seldom formally trained, they regularly monitor their own 
“performances” and make adjustments accordingly. For example, all five cats in my 
house have learned to jump up on the nearest high surface when they want to get 
away from Skipper. They could easily outrun him, but they seem to reserve running 
for times when they want to engage in play. When they want to get out of harm’s 
way, they know that up is the way to go. Similarly, when Steven and Janet Alger 
studied interaction in a cat shelter, they found that even in behavior such as 
territoriality, the cats engaged in negotiation rather than constant dominance and 
outright aggression. With two exceptions, cats who fought on some occasions would 
not necessarily fight all the time. Instead, their shows of dominance were “highly 
relative and limited by time and place and activity” (2003a: 130).  
 Examples of behavioral flexibility from the wild are numerous. The research is 
especially important in this context because it indicates not only the ability to adapt 
behavior, but also that animals use the kind of referential communication that Mead 
claimed did not exist among animals. Using the example of a dog fight, Mead 
explained that “we have here a conversation of gestures. They are not, however, 
gestures in the sense that they are significant. We do not assume that the dog says 
to himself, ‘If the animal comes from this direction he is going to spring at my throat 
and I will turn in such a way’” ([1934] 1962: 43).iv However, many studies have 
confirmed that numerous species have cognitive abilities that Mead and his 
contemporaries did not recognize. Indeed, research has “confirmed that the ability to 
discriminate between different alarm calls that signal the presence of different 
predators exists in a variety of species and that such signals lead to predictable 
behavior by the receivers” (Rogers and Kaplan 2004, 189). For instance, vervet 
monkeys distinguish between different vocalizations and respond accordingly 
(Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler 1980). One type of vocalization signals “leopard,” and 
the monkeys climb into the trees, but another sends them looking for snakes on the 
ground. The evolutionary benefits of this ability are clear, in that referential signaling 
and flexible behavior allows the monkeys to avoid different kinds of predators. 
Studies have revealed similar abilities among squirrels (Greene and Meagher 1998), 
meerkats (Manser 2001), marmots (Blumstein and Armitage 1997), and domestic 
chickens (Marler and Evans 1996; Evans 1997). The existence of a complex 
communication system indicates that “alarm calls may be intentional and convey 
meaning beyond a simple ‘read-out’ of the sender’s emotional state” (Rogers and 
Kaplan 2004, 189; see also Kaplan and Rogers 2001). Among companion animals, 
examples of behavioral flexibility are numerous. Some of the earliest observations 
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come from the work of the Nobel Prize winning ethologist Konrad Lorenz (1952, 
1953), best known for studying the imprinting of geese. Among the many examples 
recorded among dogs and cats, their ability to adjust their behavior around children 
and their play strategies are noteworthy.  
 The ability to adapt behavior indicates consciousness because it implies 
monitoring of one’s own performance: “If this happens, I do that; if that happens, I do 
something else.” In addition to behavioral flexibility, another characteristic that 
indicates consciousness is multi-sensory integration, or the ability to access 
information from different information pathways (see Allen and Bekoff 1997). For 
example, I might recognize a friend from a distance by the general shape of her body 
or the way she walks. If I cannot see her, I could nevertheless recognize her voice if 
she called out to me. Her dog could also recognize her scent. Species differ in the 
capacity to respond to certain stimuli, and her dog would have the advantage here, 
but I might also recognize her customary perfume. In short, multi-sensory integration 
means that we use various sensory pathways to gather information about our world. 
It is relevant for consciousness because it allows for the detection of misinformation 
based on a single input. For example, if I see someone who at first appears to be my 
friend, but then I hear that person speak in a voice I do not recognize, I can adjust my 
behavior to avoid the surprise and embarrassment of misidentifying that person. 
Likewise, Skipper might initially shy away from me if I appeared from a distance in a 
rain cape and hat. If I spoke to him on approaching, however, he would not be fooled, 
and once he sniffed me the test would be over. The ability to integrate information 
from different sensory pathways allows beings to detect misinformation and respond 
to it. The resulting behavioral flexibility both depends on and indicates 
consciousness.  
 Evidence of a theory of mind constitutes a reliable indicator of awareness of 
self. This refers to the ability to know (or wonder) what another individual is thinking 
(see Gopnik 1993, for a review). Human infants show evidence of being capable to 
interpret the mental states of others at between two and three years of age. Many 
species of animals have also demonstrated this ability. Chimpanzees and macaques 
have successfully distinguished between the “knower” and the “guesser,” learning to 
act on the advice of the former rather than the latter (Thomasello and Call 1997; 
Povinelli, Nelson, and Boysen 1990; Povinelli, Parks, and Novak 1991).  
 One reliable indicator of whether an individual has a theory of mind is the 
ability to share the focus of attention. When a person or animal “attend[s] to the 
direction in which another is looking, the individual must have first realized that the 
other is attending to something different and at a distance” (Rogers and Kaplan 2004: 
182). In infants, the capacity to alternately look at the mother’s face and a “target” that 
the mother is pointing to or looking at begins at about twelve months of age. The act of 
alternately following the mother’s gaze while “checking in” with her eyes and face 
suggests more than simply the ability to follow the mother’s line of vision. It constitutes 
“a deliberate attempt to validate whether the joint attention has been achieved, that is, 
whether the focus of attention is being shared” (Stern 1985: 129).  
 Domestic dogs regularly follow the gaze of their human companions (see 
Sanders 1999; Irvine 2004a). As Sanders points out, dogs “display considerable 
interest in human facial expression and direct their own gaze in the directions indicated 
by human attention” (1999: 144). Research shows that dogs perform better at mutual 
looking than do great apes (Call 2003).v Dogs perform remarkably well in tasks 
requiring that they interpret signals from people, such as gazing and pointing, in order to 
find food. Dogs’ striking ability to follow human signals is especially relevant for the self 
because the ability is not thought to be instinctual. Dogs (and even puppies) perform 
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these tasks far better than do wolves (Vila, Maldonado, and Wayne 1999; Wayne and 
Ostrander 1999). This indicates that the ability may have been acquired during the long 
process of domestication (Ruvinsky and Sampson 2001), which makes it a highly 
interactional, social skill.  
 In sum, the past decade, in particular, has seen mounting evidence that 
animals have the ability to see themselves as objects. We can acknowledge that 
animals have this ability even if we also want to argue that it is impossible to know 
the quality or contents of their consciousness. Thus, we can grant animals 
consciousness even if we do not have access to exactly what their consciousness is 
“like.” But this begs the question of whether consciousness is tantamount to the self. 
 
 
Consciousness and Selfhood 
The concern for sociologists, whether focusing on human or non-human 
animals, has historically been the self, rather than consciousness. The term 
consciousness seldom appears in the sociological literature. I contend that 
sociologists have created an arbitrary distinction between self and consciousness 
and have entered the conversation only when the most sophisticated expressions of 
self-awareness appear. More specifically, sociologists have staked their claims only 
once spoken language and high levels of coordinated activity appear. In doing so, 
they deemed any less sophisticated expressions of self-awareness as unworthy of 
sociological investigation. They have defined the self in such uniquely human terms 
that it is impossible for other animals to “have” or “be” selves 
Because of Mead’s influence, and particularly because of his emphasis on 
language, sociologists who study the self have traditionally done so through 
narratives or descriptions of self-concepts. Such research provides insight into how 
selfhood is constructed within the context of language, but it fails to offer a coherent 
theory of self in the absence of verbal ability. In response, scholars have ventured into 
this terrain with the study of selfhood among the mentally disabled (Pollner and 
McDonald-Wikler 1985; Bogdan and Taylor 1989), Alzheimer’s patients (Gubrium 
1986), infants (Brazelton 1984; Stern 1985), deaf and blind children (Goode 1994), 
autistic children (Rocque 2003), and companion animals (Sanders 1999; Alger and 
Alger 1997, 2003; Irvine 2004a,b,c; Konecki 2005). In all these instances, those who 
provide care for others who have no capacity for verbal expression “literally ‘do’ the 
minds and selves” of those who cannot speak” (Holstein and Gubrium 2000: 152). 
Through close, frequent interaction over a significant period, caregivers learn to read 
the non-verbal indicators of the self. 
The criticism launched against this research is that attributing selves to those who 
cannot speak simply imposes a sense of self, with varying degrees of legitimacy for 
doing so. In the case of animals, it lays one open to charges of anthropomorphism. 
Granting selfhood to animals, most commonly in the form of personality, is something 
all children do. However, the tendency is shamed out of most of us before adulthood, as 
we are told that it is silly to believe that animals can think or feel as we do. Mead put it 
differently, but the message is the same. He wrote that “we, of course, tend to endow 
our domestic animals with personality, but as we get insight into their conditions we 
see there is no place for this sort of importation of the social process into the conduct 
of the individual” ([1934] 1962: 182). In contrast, a decade’s worth of sociological 
research on human-animal interaction argues that as we get insight into the 
“conditions” of animals, we gain more evidence for their ability to see themselves as 
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objects (see Arluke and Sanders 1996; Sanders 1999; Sanders and Arluke 1993; 
Alger and Alger 2003b; Irvine 2004a, b, c).  
It is time to revise the sociological understanding of the self away from the focus 
on language. Skeptics will reply that changing the definition of the self to include 
animals is an unfair move. I would make clear that I do not claim that humans and 
non-human animals have exactly the same capacities. I have no illusions that my dog 
and my cats harbor any desire to compose their memoirs, nor do I believe the birds I 
hear outside care one wit about what I think. I agree that humans have a highly 
sophisticated sense of self that allows us to accomplish interactions that animals 
cannot undertake. However, as Arluke and Sanders (1996) pointed out, I argue that 
the differences are of degree rather than kind. Non-human animals have capacities 
that are important for their social lives, and it would be as unfair to measure human 
potential by their capacities as it is to measure their potential by human capacities. 
As far as a sociological understanding of animals and selfhood is concerned, the 
game has been rigged from the start. It is not biological, social, or psychological 
deficiencies that prevent the acknowledgement of animal selfhood; it is 
anthropocentrism, or the belief that all things should be judged in relation to humans. 
The prospect of animal selves is simply threatening to our field of study. In defense, 




Anthropocentrism: The price of defending sociology’ s terrain 
Anthropocentrism is one of the oldest social constructions. Anthropological 
research suggests that pre-literate peoples lived with nature in a relationship of 
oneness and respect (see Ingold 1994; Schwabe 1994; Noske 1997). To be sure, 
people could distinguish themselves from animals, but there is no evidence that they 
saw themselves as superior to the other creatures around them. They used animals’ 
bodies to meet their material needs, but they also used animals, as beings, to meet 
spiritual needs. Many, if not most, preliterate peoples considered animals superior to 
humans, having magical, even divine powers.  
 The abiding respect for animals diminished as the means of production 
changed. Anthropologist Elizabeth Lawrence explains that “it is impossible to 
overestimate the importance of mankind’s change from hunter-gatherer to 
domesticator of plants and animals” (Lawrence 1986: 46). The survival of hunter-
gatherers meant that they could not overexploit the environment on which they 
depended. In contrast, the transition to farming required a conquering attitude toward 
the natural world. The farmer engages in continual battle with nature by eliminating 
plants and animals that have been labeled as "weeds" and "pests." The farmer also 
manipulates water and the reproduction of crops. The success of settled, agricultural 
civilizations required an attitude of domination, justified through beliefs that animals 
were not only "others," but also inferiors (see Thomas 1983; Tuan 1984; Franklin 
1999). “Progress” required human communities to define the natural world (and its 
non-human animals) "as fundamentally different and ontologically separate" from 
their own (Wolch 1998: 121).vi 
One subject that sociologists understand is power. We know that when a group 
has it, the members will not give it up without a fight. Thus, we humans are reluctant 
to admit the similarities we share with other animals. As a discipline, sociology 
emerged to point out how humans were not only different from what Mead regularly 
refers to as the “lower animals,” but they were also better. Humans, after all, had 
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culture, society, religion, tools, and most important, language. The anthropocentric 
bias in the discipline has loosened its grip only slightly; overall, the belief that humans 
are not only unique still reigns. This is so even when ample research on animal 
behavior asserts otherwise. A slight digression will allow me to make this point. 
 Janet and Steven Alger (2003b) reviewed thirty major introductory sociology 
textbooks on the market as of December 2001. The Algers investigated how animals 
were constructed in the texts and how well the texts integrated newer research on 
animals that would allow the discipline to move beyond Mead. Introductory texts very 
often serve as students’ first and most formative exposure to sociology. The Algers 
found that “with few exceptions, the main function of the treatment of animals in 
these texts is to affirm the hard line that sociology has always drawn between 
humans and other species” (Alger and Alger ibidem: 1). In addition, they found that 
the discipline “has not offered an adequate response to the new knowledge of animal 
behavior accumulated over the past twenty years” (Alger and Alger ibidem: 83-84). 
One of the best examples comes from the texts’ ubiquitous chapters on culture.  
 
All of the textbooks we reviewed had a chapter or section devoted to human 
culture and all of the authors defined human culture in essentially the same 
way. Culture is a ‘design or blueprint for living,’ a ‘way of life,’ or a ‘social 
heritage.’ Culture is learned, it is shared, and it is passed on to the next 
generation. The elements of culture offered by these authors were also very 
similar and included beliefs, values, norms, symbols, language, customs, 
technology, knowledge and material objects. And, the tremendous diversity 
of cultures among different human groupings constituted the evidence that 
culture is a human creation, and not biologically determined. When these 
same authors turned their attention to the question of animals and culture, 
however, several problems immediately became apparent. (Alger and Alger 
ibidem: 72) 
 
The first problem was one of poor scholarship. Most of the texts made claims 
about animals and culture (or more often, the lack of) without references, indicating 
that “many authors believed their views on animal culture were so well established 
that no source was necessary or that comments about animals were not of sufficient 
importance to warrant serious research” (Alger and Alger ibidem: 72). In the absence 
of references, authors ignored solid research asserting that numerous species of 
animals are indeed capable of developing culture (e.g., Alger and Alger 1999, 2003a 
on cats; Dawkins 1998; Goodall 1986 on chimpanzees; Pepperberg 1991 on parrots; 
Thomas 1993, 1994 on dogs and cats; Whiten et al. 1999 on chimpanzees). 
 The second problem concerned the evidence cited in the texts. The Algers 
explain that “if the authors were asking whether animals have culture, then, just as 
they did with humans, they needed to look at research that compares separate 
groupings of the same species to see if they had developed different solutions to the 
everyday problems of living” (Alger and Alger 2003b: 73). Only two texts cited this 
sort of evidence; most simply mentioned tool use among animals without seeking 
studies that investigated the variation in behavior that indicates culture. Eaton’s 
(1976) study of macaques, native to Japan, who were transported to Oregon offers a 
good example. In Japan, where the colony occupied a large area, the adult males 
lived apart from females and their offspring. When juvenile male macaques got into 
fights, the mothers intervened because of proximity. Consequently, in Japan, the 
mother macaques’ fighting ability influenced male dominance. However, in Oregon, 
the colony had less space, and the adult males lived with it. Males intervened in 
fights because they were close by, eliminating the females’ role in the establishment 
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of male dominance. Similarly, Marler and Tamura (1964) found geographic variation 
in the songs of sparrows. In short, the research on animals uses the term “culture” to 
describe cases “in which one community can be readily distinguished from another 
by its unique suite of behavioral characteristics” (de Waal 1999). However, 
sociologists still cling to only one capacity in the “suite,” which is language.vii 
 Disparagement and denial of animals’ capacities also posed a problem in 
introductory texts. Even when authors acknowledged that animals had some form of 
culture, they took pains to elevate human expressions. To offer an illustrative case, 
one text instructs readers that “humans are not unique just because they make and 
use tools. However, the tools that humans make are unequaled in complexity. Think 
of the difference between using a twig to catch termites and making an automobile” 
(Andersen and Taylor 2002: 63). In most texts, the cultural “ante was raised such that 
it was necessary to have high culture to be considered as having a culture worthy of 
the name” (Alger and Alger 2003a: 75).  
 I used the Algers’ research on textbooks to make a point. The failure to 
recognize culture among animals presents an analytic parallel to the failure to 
recognize self. One only needs to examine the research to learn that the evidence 
exists. The failure to look for and recognize the evidence not only signifies 
entrenched anthropocentrism, it also hints at disciplinary arrogance. This stems from 
the fear that including animals in the conversation about selfhood will somehow 
diminish human uniqueness. Acknowledging animal selfhood will mean we have to 
change not only the way we think about them, but the way we treat them. Most 
tellingly, the failure to recognize self leads to a refusal to enter the conversation 
about the moral standing of animals. I suggest that this is the most frightening aspect 
of animal selfhood for sociologists. As Jerolmack warns, the study of animal selfhood 
could result in human-animal studies “being dismissed as a thinly veiled, 
institutionalized branch of the animal rights movement (Jerolmack 2005: 651). 
 On first reading this, I thought of the comparison in human terms. Those who 
study race and ethnicity do not have to defend themselves against charges that they 
are supporting civil rights. Those who study gender inequality are not dismissed as 
feminists. However, we who study animals risk being disparaged and dismissed out 
of hand. This is speciesism, and it points to how the question of animal selfhood is 




The benefits to sociology from including animals in its studies have been amply 
documented by others. Clifton Bryant’s now classic paper on “The Zoological 
Connection” (1979) outlines numerous potential avenues for sociological study. 
Bryant mentions, among others, the prevalence of animal metaphors in our 
language, animal imagery, artifacts, and labels in our material culture, animals as 
social problems, animals and work, and zoological crime. Arnold Arluke’s research on 
animal experimentation and cruelty (e.g., 1988, 1989, 1991, 2004, 2006) reveals that 
the study of cruelty in its social context provides valuable insights into how the 
discipline and the culture at-large defines cruelty and determines what to do about it. 
Clifton Flynn’s groundbreaking research on the role of animals in domestic violence 
concurs that “animal cruelty is a social phenomenon,” requiring sociological study to 
counter decades of psychological framing (2001: 74; see also 1999a, b, 2000a,b,c). 
The work of Steven and Janet Alger, discussed in this paper, expands the 
sociological understanding of culture. Research by Clinton Sanders and Leslie Irvine, 
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also discussed here, broadens sociological theories of the mind and the self. These 
scholars, and others, have demonstrated that including animals in sociological 
research can only improve the discipline. My intention here is not to reinvent this 
wheel by providing yet more examples of how animals can enrich our knowledge. 
Rather, I want to emphasize that enriched knowledge brings increased responsibility. 
The question is not only, “what can animals do for sociology?” It is also one of “what 
can sociology do for animals?” Knowledge without practice simply highlights the 
question posed by Alfred McClung Lee (1978): “Sociology for Whom?” After several 
decades of systematic sociological research on interaction with non-human animals, 
it is time to put those research findings into practice. In the context of this paper, 
research that documents the accomplishment of selfhood among animals carries the 
obligation to recognize animals’ moral standing.  
 Mead recognized a relationship between selfhood and moral standing, and 
explained the implications of a lack of self in this way: 
 
We put personalities into the animals, but they do not belong to them; and 
ultimately we realize that those animals have no rights. We are at liberty to 
cut off their lives; there is no wrong committed when an animal's life is 
taken away. He has not lost anything because the future does not exist for 
the animal; he has not the ‘me’ in his experience which by the response of 
the ‘I’ is in some sense under his control, so that the future can exist for 
him. (Mead [1934]1962: 183) 
 
Quite simply, if animals cannot see themselves as objects, then they have no 
sense of what happens as happening to them, as individuals. Here, as in other 
instances, Mead’s logic is outdated. Ample evidence shows that the future does exist 
for at least some species of animals. To be sure, it does not exist for them in the 
same sense as it does for human beings. We make elaborate plans for the future, 
imagining what we might do or become. Animals’ lives pose no need for them to 
engage in this kind of planning. However, research shows that many animals do hold 
expectations, which is a solid indicator of having an idea of what the future might 
hold. For example, Bekoff’s (1995) extensive research on canine play behavior 
reveals that dogs hold expectations. He found that some dogs “appear surprised 
when their play signals are responded to with aggression—they seem to expect that 
play will follow” (Allen and Bekoff 1997: 154; see also Lorenz 1953). Hunting, storing 
food, and building nests are all evidence that animals make plans for the future. 
Research has not yet determined whether animals take these actions instinctually or 
whether they actually think ahead. In the absence of reliable studies, it would be 
premature to assert that animals lack the ability to engage in planning. If the future 
exists for animals, then animals can see themselves as objects. If animals can see 
themselves as objects, then they have selves. If they have selves, then there are 
significant implications for the way we treat them and for their status in society.  
 The history of the discipline illustrates that simply including members of a 
marginalized group is not in itself transformative, either for the discipline or for the 
members of the group. For example, what is called the “add women and stir” 
approach, which merely incorporated women into existing scholarship, did little to 
challenge institutionalized sexism. However, feminist scholars (e.g., Smith 1990; 
Andersen and Collins 1992) made it clear that knowledge about women was 
embedded in material and social structures of power. Once women had a voice from 
their own standpoint, sociological knowledge was transformed and transformative. 
Because it addressed existing systems of sexist oppression from the standpoint of 
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those who experienced the effects of that oppression, knowledge gained in this way 
could begin to challenge sexism.  
 Scholars have pointed out that oppression seldom exists in isolation. As Nibert 
puts it, “the arrangements that lead to various forms of oppression are intricately 
woven together in such a way that the exploitation of one group frequently augments 
and compounds the mistreatment of others” (Nibert 2003: 6). Sociology has 
developed the tools to study sexism, racism, and other forms of oppression. 
However, the discipline has not yet challenged speciesism, which philosophers and 
others have compared to sexism and racism (see Singer [1975] 2002; Regan 1982; 
Speigel 1986). As Arluke points out, the neglect of animals in sociology “is strikingly 
ironic, given the discipline’s willingness in recent years to consider the plight of 
virtually every human minority” (Arluke 2003: 26, 2002). Several factors have led to 
this neglect. The first is the fear of or skepticism toward equating animals with 
humans. The increasing knowledge about the emotional and cognitive capacities of 
animals threatens the way sociologists have defined the social world (see Arluke 
2003; Kruse 2003). If we come to believe that animals have selves, and therefore 
deserve at least some moral standing, the interests of animals will deserve equal 
consideration. Put differently, the recognition that humans and animals are more 
similar than they are different challenges sociology’s view that humans are 
sufficiently unique to merit their own field of study. To be sure, humans are indeed 
unique. But we need not deny that humans have special capacities in order to extend 
that recognition to animals, as well. Humans have gone to the moon, but a dog can 
be trained to sniff out cancer or bombs. Human uniqueness or superiority alone is not 
a sufficient argument for depriving animals of moral consideration. In any case, most 
of us would disagree that “might makes right.” However, this is the basis of our 
disciplinary neglect of non-human animals. Sociology can reveal what underpins the 
assumptions of human superiority. It can explore what makes it possible for people to 
think of some animals as food and others as family members. It can also explore the 
economic, political, and religious structures that uphold speciesism, even as other 
forms of oppression are regularly challenged.  
 The second reason that more sociologists have not incorporated non-human 
animals into our work is that it makes some of us uncomfortable. The majority of 
sociologists, like the majority of people, in general, prefer not to think about the ways 
that they are implicated in the abuse of animals. Put more simply, studying the 
oppression of animals makes us feel guilty. Exploring speciesism makes one aware 
of the oppression of animals and one’s own role in the process. Simply by eating 
meat and wearing leather, one is condoning institutionalized practices that cause an 
enormous amount of suffering to animals. This awareness also occurs when studying 
gender inequality, racism, homophobia, ageism, and other forms of discrimination. 
The resulting experience of consciousness-raising can be difficult to ignore.  
 Finally, some might argue that when one considers all the problems in the 
world, sociologists should devote our considerable research energies to solving 
some of the significant human issues. Poverty, environmental degradation, 
homelessness, war, and the threat of terrorism are all high on the social agenda. 
Some would argue that they are more pressing than the well-being of animals. The 
flaw in this argument is that all problems are connected, and the segmenting of 
issues is both illogical and morally questionable. For example, the moral status of 
animals as property justifies institutionalized cruelty on the basis that we humans can 
use them as we see fit. The ideology of superiority, coupled with “might makes right,” 
also underpins sexism, racism, and homophobia.  
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 In sum, sociologists cannot ignore the issue of the moral status of animals 
simply by claiming that we have more important work to do on other issues. That is 
akin to saying that one has chosen to ignore sexism to better engage in opposition to 
war. The ideological assumptions that uphold our oppression of animals are well 
within the realm of sociological study. Animals deserve to be members of the moral 
community because they share our interests in not suffering. They have interests in 
not suffering because, like us, they can see themselves as objects. They have 







i The notion of the self as a product of evolution has significant implications for 
sociological concepts. For example, if we accept the evolutionary account of the 
self, then we also deny that the self can be an illusion or a story, because 
natural selection works only on the heritable components of traits. 
ii For additional discussions of Mead’s oversights regarding animals, see Irvine 
2003; Konecki 2005. 
iii For another account of this instance, see Bekoff 2002: 86. 
iv For another discussion of this passage from Mead, see Konecki 2005 
v The finding that dogs perform better than great apes is relevant for animal rights 
because it defies the logic of the Great Ape Project, which seeks to include in 
the community of equals all great apes (human beings, chimpanzees, gorillas, 
and orangutans) based on considerable cognitive (and other) similarities.  
vi Anthropocentrism was forever validated when Judaism, Islam, and Christianity 
endorsed its strong form, known as dominionism, or a divine right to rule over 
nature Some Biblical scholars claim that interpretations of the Hebrew that 
justify using animals as we please misrepresent the original Hebrew. Alternative 
interpretations translate the original as "stewardship," a form of 
anthropocentrism conveying a "God-given responsibility to care for the earth" 
(Linzey 1998, 287), rather than granting the right to rule over it (see also Cohen 
1989). 
vii Along similar lines, evidence that meerkats teach their young about hunting 
appeared in the journal Science 14 July 2006: (Vol. 313 no. 5784: 227 – 229). 
The authors point out that “the lack of evidence for teaching in species other 
than humans may reflect problems in producing unequivocal support for the 
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